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History Uprooted: Georgia Applies
Apportionment to Strict Liability
Claims *
I. INTRODUCTION
Adrienne Johns had experience riding motorcycles for over 20 years
when in 2013, total failure of the front brake on his 2006 Suzuki
GSX-R1000 caused him to hit a curb, throwing him from his bike and
knocking him unconscious. The accident resulted in Johns being
hospitalized for over two months following spinal fusion surgery and
surgery to repair his hand. Subsequent to the accident, he discovered
that there had been a recall notice from Suzuki related to his bike model’s
front brake. At trial, Johns proved that a design defect in the front brake
had ultimately caused the brake to fail, resulting in Johns’ accident. The
jury awarded Johns $10.5 million in compensatory damages. 1 Under
common law principles of strict liability, Johns would receive the verdict
in whole. However, the Georgia Supreme Court upheld the jury’s
apportionment of 49% of the fault to Johns himself for his failure to
properly maintain the brake fluid. 2 This may seem at odds with common
law principles of strict liability because it is.
Apportionment and contributory negligence in tort law have been
evolving bodies of statutes and judicial law throughout legal history.
However, one thing that has historically remained steadfast in the state
of Georgia has been the common law principle that a plaintiff’s
comparative negligence is not a defense to a claim based upon strict
liability. 3 But now, as we have seen in the illustration above, that has
changed for the state of Georgia and is up for debate in other
jurisdictions. 4 This reassessment of the appropriateness of
* I would like to thank my faculty advisor, Professor Jarome Gautreaux, for his feedback
and collaboration throughout the writing of this Comment. I would also like to thank my
student writing editor, Sandy Davis, for her feedback, critique, and patience.
1 Suzuki Motor of Am., Inc. v. Johns, 351 Ga. App. 186, 189, 830 S.E.2d 549, 554 (2019).
2 Johns v. Suzuki Motor of Am., No. S19G1478, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 760, 2 (Oct. 19, 2020).
3 Deere & Co. v. Brooks, 250 Ga. 517, 520–21, 299 S.E.2d 704, 707 (1983).
4 See Suzuki, 351 Ga. App. 186 at 198, 830 S.E.2d at 560.
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apportionment in strict liability cases in Georgia follows on the heels of
numerous states reconsidering a similar long standing common law
principle—the rule against apportionment among intentional and
negligent tortfeasors. 5 Following tort reform in Georgia that reshaped
the apportionment statute, courts have been tasked with interpreting the
changes with the backdrop of years of Georgia case law following common
law principles. Other states, including Pennsylvania, have been facing
similar tasks of statutory interpretation in relation to apportionment in
strict liability and inevitably reaching varying results.
The topic examined in this Comment is where Georgia law now
stands in regard to applying apportionment in strict liability cases
compared to other jurisdictions and what this new direction may mean
for practitioners and plaintiffs in the state. This Comment will consider
the development of tort law in the areas of contributory negligence and
strict liability from common law to present. Specifically, Part II will
provide an historical overview of apportionment in tort law, looking at
the history of contributory negligence, joint and several liability, and
contribution. Part III will track the development and implementation of
the body of law known as strict liability and the historical applicability
of apportionment to strict liability claims. Part IV will then compare and
contrast how various states have approached the applicability of
apportionment in strict liability cases following various versions of tort
reform. Part V will compare this change in approach to how some states
have progressed to allowing apportionment to intentional tortfeasors.
Finally, Part VI will address how the recent Georgia Supreme Court
decision will affect plaintiffs and practitioners in their approach to cases
involving strict liability claims in Georgia and argue why the common
law principles should have been maintained.
II. THE WORLD OF APPORTIONMENT: CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE, JOINT
AND SEVERAL LIABILITY, AND CONTRIBUTION
A. The Transition from Contributory Negligence to Systems of
Comparative Negligence
Originating in England in 1806, the common law doctrine of
contributory negligence completely barred a plaintiff from recovering if

5 See Couch v. Red Roof Inns, Inc., 291 Ga. 359, 359, 729 S.E.2d 378, 379 (2012) (allowing
jury to consider the “fault” of criminal assailant and include the assailant when
apportioning its damages award to the plaintiff); Slack v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 5 P. 3d
280, 285 (Colo. 2000) (holding that Colorado’s comparative fault statute was applicable even
though the defendant committed an intentional tort).

2020]

HISTORY UPROOTED

503

his or her own negligence contributed to the injury. 6 The doctrine is often
referred to as the “all-or-nothing” rule for its hallmark of awarding a
plaintiff damages or denying them any recovery whatsoever due to
contributing to the injury via their own negligence. 7 Although at first
glance this rule may seem based in fairness by disallowing negligent
plaintiffs from recovering from others for their own carelessness, the
all-or-nothing approach often denies justice in practice. Under this rule
a plaintiff who is severely injured, yet barely negligent, would be barred
from recovering from a very negligent defendant. A good example is a
jaywalker who tries to cross an intersection late at night and is hit by a
driver who is speeding, has his headlights off, and runs a red light. 8 The
jay walker’s negligence pales in comparison to the acts of the driver, yet
the driver would be barred from recovery under the common law
contributory negligence doctrine. Some jurisdictions attempted to
mitigate the harshness of this rule by implementing exceptions such as
the last clear chance doctrine, which finds a defendant liable where a
plaintiff is also negligent if the defendant had the last clear chance to
avoid the accident, hence the name. 9
Although the doctrine of contributory negligence was initially popular,
by the early 1900’s the tide was turning for the doctrine that completely
bars recovery for even negligibly negligent plaintiffs. 10 The Federal
Employers’ Liability Act of 1908, 11 which allowed a plaintiff to recover
from a negligent defendant despite his own negligence, was influential in
this shift. 12 Through either judicial enactment or statute, forty-six states
have now replaced contributory negligence with some version of the
doctrine of comparative negligence. 13
The states that have adopted comparative negligence have typically
implemented one of two main types, pure or modified. 14 Under pure
comparative negligence, a plaintiff can recover the amount of his
damages reduced by a percentage of his causal negligence, and every
person that contributes to the damage is only liable for the percentage of
6 James McMillan. Comment: Contributory Negligence and Statutory Damage Limits—
An Old Alternative to a Contemporary Movement?, 42 IDAHO L. REV. 269, 274 (2005).
7 Li v. Yellow Cab., Co., 532 P.2d 1226, 1233 (1975).
8 Andrew White, Comment, Perpetuating Injustice: Analyzing the Maryland Court of
Appeals’ Refusal to Change the Common Law Doctrine of Contributory Negligence, 78 MD.
L. REV. 1043, 1045 (2019).
9 Sinclair v. Record Press, 323 P. 2d 660, 663 (1958).
10 White, supra note 8 at 1042.
11 45 U.S.C. § 51–59 (1908).
12 Thomas R. Trenkner, Modern development of comparative negligence doctrine having
applicability to negligence actions generally, 78 A.L.R.3d 339, 2a.
13 White, supra note 8 at 1042.
14 Trenker, supra note 12 at 2b.
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negligence apportioned to him or her. 15 It matters not whether the
plaintiff contributed one percent or ninety-nine percent in a pure
comparative negligence system. They may still recover. However, in a
modified comparative negligence state, such as Georgia, a plaintiff may
only recover if his percentage of contributed negligence is less than that
contributed by the defendant, or numerically, less than 50% percent. 16
B. Joint and Several Liability
The common law doctrine of joint and several liability developed in a
way similar to that of contributory negligence. 17 The doctrine originally
allowed multiple tortfeasors who acted in concert to be subject to joint
liability, meaning each tortfeasor could potentially be liable for the entire
amount of damages. 18 In the early twentieth century, joint and several
liability expanded to include defendants who caused an indivisible injury
to the plaintiff. 19 The idea behind this doctrine was to allow a practical
way to ensure that the plaintiff was able to recover for their damages
from some source. In states where defendants can be joint and severally
liable, it is left to the defendants to sort out their respective proportions
of liability and payment between each other. For example, if Defendant
A and Defendant B are held joint and severally liable and Defendant A
pays the plaintiff damages of $100,000, Defendant A can then seek
contribution, or in other words partial reimbursement, from Defendant
B.
C. Contribution
Under common law, it was believed that injuries were indivisible and
as such, fault could not be apportioned. As a result, contribution among
joint tortfeasors was staunchly prohibited. A plaintiff would be more apt
to seek to recover from a defendant with monetary resources, regardless
of his degree of fault, because of the likelihood that the wealthier
defendant would be able to pay the damages. This left one defendant
carrying the burden of all involved with no ability to seek help from
others who also contributed to the damages. As such, Defendant A from
Gross v. Denow, 212 N.W.2d 2, 7 (1973).
O.C.G.A. § 51-11-7 (2020).
17 See Kathleen M. O’Conner & Gregory P. Sreenan, Apportionment of Damages:
Evolution of Fault-Based Systems of Liability for Negligence, 61 J. AIR. L. & COM. 365, 368
(1995).
18 See W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton On The Law of Torts, § 46 at 323 n.3
(5th ed. 1984 & Supp. 1988); see also Frank J. Vandall, A Critique of The Restatement
(Third): Apportionment as it Affects Joint and Several Liability, 49 EMORY L.J. 565, 565–
66 (2000).
19 Vandall, supra note 18 at 567–68.
15
16
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the example above, at common law, would not be able to seek contribution
from Defendant B if there was a judgement against him, thus making
Defendant A shoulder the $100,000 alone. This innate unfairness led to
criticism of the rule against contribution and by the 1960s a majority of
jurisdictions in the United States had enacted statutes to allow
contribution among joint tortfeasors. 20
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF STRICT LIABILITY
Strict liability holds a unique place in the world of apportionment.
Under the doctrine of strict liability, certain conduct and activities are so
inherently dangerous that a defendant will be liable regardless of fault.
In other words, strict liability, in a nutshell, is liability without fault; the
plaintiff need only prove that the tort occurred and that the defendant is
responsible. As a result, this area of tort law is very limited. The three
main categories of strict liability are: (1) the keeping of wild animals; (2)
ultrahazardous activities; and (3) consumer product liability. The
common denominator of these three categories is that each is dangerous
in some way and requires a high level of responsibility by the defendant.
As such, strict liability principles are distinct from those of negligence. 21
In negligence, liability is imposed for the failure to exercise reasonable
care, whereas in strict liability, liability may be imposed even when
reasonable care is exercised. 22
A. Strict Liability for Animals
Strict liability is applicable to the keeping of wild animals for obvious
reasons. One, there is no real need for people to keep such exotic animals
like bobcats, lions, and tigers as pets. 23 Further, there is a clear high risk
of injury resulting from the keeping of such animals and as such the
owner does so at his own peril. 24 Strict liability has also been applied to
trespassing domesticated animals which are capable of causing
substantial harm when forcing their way onto another’s property. The
20 Michael D. Green, Essay: The Unanticipated Ripples of Comparative Negligence
Superseding Cause in Products Liability and Beyond, 53 S.C. L. REV. 1103, 1113 n.16 (2002)
(citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 23 cmt. a (AM. L.
INST. 2000)).
21 Kenneth S. Abraham, Strict Liability in Negligence, 61 DEPAUL L. REV. 271, 271
(2012).
22 Id. at 274.
23 See Collins v. Otto, 369 P.2d 564, 566 (Colo. 1962) (stating that the keeping of a wild
animal is unjustified).
24 See Charles E Cantu, Distinguishing the Concept of Strict Liability in Tort from Strict
Product Liability: Medusa Unveiled 33 U. MEM. L. REV. 823 (2003) (citing Smith v. La Farm
Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 603 So. 2d 199, 202 (La. Ct. App. 1992) (jury charge stated that
keeping a wild animal is done so at your own peril)).
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final category of animals to which strict liability is applicable is domestic
animals with vicious tendencies. The idea that the keepers of these
animals should be responsible for their actions that cause injuries is
quite clear—the onus should be on the one choosing to keep such animals,
not the victims of their attacks. As a result, strict liability in this arena
has been consistently applied.
B. Strict Liability for Ultrahazardous Activities
Strict liability as applied to ultrahazardous activities is a fairly new
concept and can be traced to Rylands v. Fletcher, 25 a Nineteenth-century
English case. In Rylands, the defendant erected a reservoir on his land
to supply his mill with hydroelectricity. He worked with an engineer and
a contractor to ensure the project was done properly. However, the weight
of the water was too great, and the tanks collapsed. The escaped water
flooded the plaintiff’s coal mine. Although there was a total absence of
fault on the part of the defendant, the House of Lords decided that the
defendant was responsible for the damage caused by the unnatural use
of his land. 26
In tort law today, an abnormally dangerous activity is one that is not
in common usage and which creates a foreseeable and significant risk of
harm even when reasonable care is taken by the one engaging in the
activity. 27 In a more recent case, a court applied strict liability to a gas
truck driver defendant who was in an accident that caused the death of
the plaintiff because the transportation of gas is an inherently dangerous
activity due to the risks involved. 28 The idea behind applying strict
liability to these type of activities is similar to that which supports
applying the doctrine to the keepers of wild animals. The danger of these
activities creates a higher risk to the public for the benefit of those
performing them, and as such, those engaging in such activities should
be held responsible and carry the burden when the activities inevitably
lead to injury or harm. The law agrees.
C. Strict Liability for Consumer Products
Finally, what may be categorized as the broadest area of law involving
strict liability is consumer products liability. The development of strict
liability’s application to product manufacturers developed in response to
manufacturers insulating themselves from liability for breach of
warranty or contract by arguing lack of privity, a requirement to recover
3 L.R.-E. & I. App. 300 (H.L. 1868); see also Cantu, supra note 24, at 839 n. 83.
3 L.R.-E. & I. App. at 331–40.
27 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 20(b) (2009).
28 Siegler v. Kuhlman, 502 P.2d 1181, 1187 (Wash. 1972).
25

26 Rylands,
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in either action. 29 As courts began to develop the body of law known as
strict liability, the following rationales and policies in favor of this
application of liability without fault developed:
(1) Manufacturers convey to the public a general sense of product
quality through the use of mass advertising and merchandising
practices, causing consumers to rely for their protection upon the skill
and expertise of the manufacturing community.
(2) Consumers no longer have the ability to protect themselves
adequately from defective products due to the vast number and
complexity of products which must be “consumed” in order to function
in modern society.
(3) Sellers are often in a better position than consumers to identify the
potential product risks, to determine the acceptable levels of such
risks, and to confine the risks within those levels.
(4) A majority of product accidents not caused by product abuse are
probably attributable to the negligent acts or omissions of
manufacturers at some stage of the manufacturing or marketing
process, yet the difficulties of discovering and proving this negligence
are often practicably insurmountable.
(5) Negligence liability is generally insufficient
manufacturers to market adequately safe products.

to

induce

(6) Sellers almost invariably are in a better position than consumers
to absorb or spread the costs of product accidents.
(7) The costs of injuries flowing from typical risks inherent in products
can fairly be put upon the enterprises marketing the products as a cost
of their doing business, thus assuring that these enterprises will fully
“pay their way” in the society from which they derive their profits. 30

These rationales are illustrative of the underlying public policy in favor
of shifting the burden of defective products from the consumer onto the
manufacturer. Not only are the manufacturers in a better position to
identify and remediate such defects, but they also have the unique ability
to treat the cost of these accidents as part of doing business. The plaintiff
in a strict liability claim must show that the defendant manufactured the
product and that the defective product was the proximate cause of their

29 Tort Action for Strict Liability in Products Liability Cases, 26 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
143, 144 (1969).
30 David G. Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict Products Liability, 33 VAND. L. REV.
681, 684–85 (1980).
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injury. It is irrelevant whether the manufacturer exercised due care, as
strict liability is liability regardless of fault.
D. Common Law Principles of Apportionment in Strict Liability Claim
in Contrast to Negligence Claims
Traditionally, if liability is imposed upon a defendant manufacturer
under strict liability, the defenses of contributory and comparative
negligence are not applicable, and the award should not be apportioned
between the plaintiff and the defendant. 31 This is unlike negligence,
where comparative and contributory negligence are applicable, and the
awards are apportioned according with the proportion of fault assigned
by the jury to each negligent party. 32
IV. VARIOUS STATE APPROACHES TO LEGISLATIVE CHANGES TO
APPORTIONMENT
A. Pennsylvania’s Approach to Apportionment in Strict Liability
Asbestos Cases Following Enactment of the Fair Share Act
In 2011, Pennsylvania enacted Pennsylvania’s Fair Share Act, 33 which
provided for apportionment of liability among tortfeasors. 34 The act
intended to plainly abolish joint and several liability, with a few
exceptions, but also made changes to apportionment. 35 The language of
the act appeared to make it applicable to strict liability actions, stating
the following:
Where recovery is allowed against more than one person, including
actions for strict liability, and where liability is attributed to more
than one defendant, each defendant shall be liable for that portion of
the total dollar amount awarded as damages in the ratio of the amount
of that defendants liability to the amount of liability attributed to all
defendants and other persons to whom liability is apportioned under
subsection (a.2). 36

This suggests a change from the former Pennsylvania Supreme Court
precedent that in strict liability cases, the defendant’s responsibility for
31 Patterson
32 Id.
33

v. Long, 321 Ga. App. 157, 161, 741 S.E.2d 242, 247 (2013).

42 PA. CON. STAT. § 7102(a.1) (1) (2011).

34 Id.

35 David R. Zaslow and Mark Paladino, Pennsylvania’s Fair Share Act: Reshaping
Apportionment
in
Strict
Liability
Cases
(November
16,
12:12
PM)
https://www.whiteandwilliams.com/resources-alerts-Pennsylvanias-Fair-Share-ActReshaping-Apportionment-in-Strict-Liability-Cases.html.
36 42 PA. CON. STAT. § 7102(a.1) (1) (2011).
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damages was to be calculated on a per capita basis, meaning divided
equally among strictly liable joint tortfeasors. 37
Although the Fair Share Act seemed to be applicable to strict liability
cases, some Pennsylvania courts refused to apply the Fair Share Act to
strict liability claims in asbestos actions and possibly other strict liability
cases. 38 However, in the 2017 case Roverano v. John Crane, Inc, 39
Pennsylvania’s Supreme Court clarified the issue of the Fair Share Act’s
applicability to strict liability claims, or at least those involving asbestos.
In Roverano, the plaintiff, Mr. Roverano, was exposed to a variety of
asbestos products through the course of employment with PECO Energy
Company. Mr. Roverano was also a smoker for approximately thirty
years. He received a diagnosis of lung cancer in both lungs in November
of 2013. Subsequently, in March of 2014, Mr. Roverano initiated a strict
liability lawsuit against thirty defendants asserting that exposure to
their asbestos products caused his lung cancer. Before trial, a number of
defendants filed a motion in limine seeking a ruling that the Fair Share
Act, which required that the jury allocate liability to each defendant
depending on what percentage of total harm it caused, applied to asbestos
cases. The trial court denied the motion, finding that asbestos exposure
cannot be quantified. 40
On appellate review, the Pennsylvania Superior Court unanimously
reversed the trial court’s ruling that the Fair Share Act was not
applicable in strict liability cases, stating that “the Fair Share Act
explicitly applies in tort cases in which ‘recovery is allowed against more
than one person, including actions for strict liability.’” 41 The Superior
Court quoted legislative history to support its holding that the Fair Share
Act intends to apportion liability among liable defendants and to
eliminate the previous method of per capita allocation. 42
Approaching the issue as one of statutory interpretation, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the Superior Court’s
interpretation of the Fair Share Act’s applicability to strict liability cases
was wrong. 43 The court explained that its rejection of percentage
apportionment in strict liability basis is based on the theory that strict

37 Baker

v. AC&S Inc., 755 A.2d 664, 669 (Pa. 2000).
Hogan v. John Crane Inc., No. 120802323, 2014 WL 5490067 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl., Phila.
Cnty., order entered June 10, 2014) (granting plaintiff’s motion in limine requesting per
capita apportionment among strictly liable asbestos defendants).
39 226 A.3d 526 (Pa. 2020).
40 Id. at 528.
41 Roverano v. John Crane, Inc., 177 A. 3d 892, 907 (Pa. 2018) (quoting 42 PA. CON.
STAT. § 7102(a.1)(1)).
42 Id. (quoting 2002 Pa. Leg. J. (house) 1199 (June 4, 2002)).
43 Roverano, 226 A.3d at 538.
38
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liability torts do not contain an element of fault. 44 Pennsylvania common
law holds that “[i]n strict liability actions, liability is indeed apportioned
equally among joint tortfeasors.” 45 The court ruled that the language of
the Fair Share Act did not preempt the states common law as to equal
apportionment in strict liability cases, drawing a distinction between
apportionment in negligence cases and apportionment in strict liability
cases. 46
Pennsylvania is one of a number of states that have been faced with
interpreting and applying the changes implemented through tort reform,
which has been wide sweeping over the last half century. While
Pennsylvania’s Supreme Court interpreted the state’s tort reform act as
not preempting or deviating from a common law principle associated with
strict liability cases, the Georgia Court of Appeals reached the opposite
conclusion in the Suzuki case mentioned in the introduction of this
Comment. 47
B. Georgia’s Approach to Apportionment in Strict Liability Cases
Following Amendment to Georgia Statute Governing Apportionment
Georgia statute governs the reduction and apportionment of an award,
or bars recovery altogether, according to percentages of fault of parties
and nonparties. 48 In 2005, portions of the statute received amendments,
including sections dealing with apportionment. 49 At issue in Suzuki
Motor of America, Inc. v. Johns was the amended act’s effect on
apportionment in strict liability cases. 50 Following an accident due to
break failure on his motorcycle, the plaintiff, Johns, brought claims
including a strict products liability claim, along with negligent failure to
warn and negligent recall, seeking both compensatory and punitive
damages from the manufacturer of the defective bike. At the conclusion
of trial, the jury awarded Johns $10.5 million in compensatory damages,
finding in favor of Johns on each claim, including the strict liability claim.
The jury also found in favor of Johns’ wife on her derivative claim of loss
of consortium and awarded her $2 million. 51 The issue discussed by the
court was the jury’s apportionment of fault and the resulting
apportionment of the damages awarded. 52
44 Id.

(quoting Baker, 755 A.2d at 669).
at 539.
47 Suzuki, 351 Ga. App. at 187, 830 S.E.2d at 560.
48 O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33 (2020).
49 Suzuki, 351 Ga. App. at 197, 830 S.E.2d at 559.
50 Id. at 198, 830 S.E.2d at 560.
51 Id. at 188–89, 830 S.E.2d at 554.
52 Id. at 198, 830 S.E.2d at 560.
45 Id.
46 Id.
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The jury, upon being asked to assign the relative fault to the involved
parties, found that Johns was 49% at fault, with Suzuki bearing 45% of
the fault and the related party, Suzuki Motor Inc. of America, being 6%
at fault. The trial court proceeded to apportion the damages awarded by
the jury according to the amount of fault assigned to each party. 53 Johns
argued on appeal that the court erred by using O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33 54 to
reduce the jury’s award in accordance with its assessment of fault and
accompanying apportionment of damages. 55
Historically in Georgia, comparative negligence has not been a defense
to strict liability claims such as products liability actions. 56 More
specifically, an injured party’s careless act with respect to the product is
not a defense, where the actual cause of the injury was an unanticipated
defect in the product itself. 57 However, the Georgia Court of Appeals in
Suzuki held that the amended Georgia statute governing apportionment
was applicable to strict liability cases, thus overturning the common law
principle disallowing contributory negligence as a defense in strict
liability claims. 58
The applicable Georgia statute interpreted by the court, O.C.G.A.
§ 51-12-33(a), 59 reads as follows:
Where an action is brought against one or more persons for injury to
person or property and the plaintiff is to some degree responsible for
the injury or damages claimed, the trier of fact, in its determination of
the total amount of damages to be awarded, if any, shall determine the
percentage of fault of the plaintiff and the judge shall reduce the
amount of damages otherwise awarded to the plaintiff in proportion to
his or her percentage of fault. 60

In interpreting the legislative intent behind this statute, the court of
appeals began by looking at its plain terms which are that the statute
governs actions for “injury to person.” 61 There is no distinction made here
as to the theories of the claims involved, i.e. negligence, strict liability,
and so on. 62 The court abided by the presumption that when the

at 189, 830 S.E.2d at 554.
O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33 (2020).
55 Suzuki, 351 Ga. App. at 197, 830 S.E.2d at 559.
56 Barger v. Garden Way, 231 Ga. App. 723, 727, 726 S.E.2d 737, 742 (1998); see also
Deere & Co., 250 Ga. at 520, 299 S.E.2d at 707.
57 Deere & Co., 250 Ga. at 520, 299 S.E.2d at 707.
58 Suzuki, 351 Ga. App. at 198, 830 S.E.2d at 560.
59 O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33(a) (2020).
60 Id.
61 Suzuki, 351 Ga. App. at 198, 830 S.E.2d at 560.
62 Id.
53 Id.
54
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legislature spoke, “[it] meant what it said and said what it meant.” 63 The
statute then goes on to state that the amount of damages awarded to the
plaintiff should be reduced in accordance with “his or her percentage of
fault.” 64
Beyond applying methods of statutory interpretation, the court of
appeals also relied heavily on the Georgia Supreme Court’s ruling in
Couch v. Red Roof Inns, 65 which also provided statutory interpretation
of the statute at issue in Suzuki, O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33. In Couch, the
plaintiff alleged that the defendant’s failure as a property owner to
prevent a criminal attack caused his injury. The issue in the case was
whether the jury should apportion the awarded amount between the
intentional tortfeasor; the criminal assailant in this case; and the
negligent defendant, the property owner. 66 Under Georgia common law,
apportionment between the negligent and intentional tortfeasors would
not be allowed. However, in light of the statute there was confusion as to
the applicability of the statutory changes to apportionment to
circumstances involving both intentional and negligent tortfeasors. The
United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia certified
the following two questions to the Supreme Court of Georgia:
(1) In a premises liability case in which the jury determines a
defendant property owner negligently failed to prevent a foreseeable
criminal attack, is the jury allowed to consider the “fault” of the
criminal assailant and apportion its award of damages among the
property owner and the criminal assailant, pursuant to O.C.G.A.
§ 51-12-33?
(2) In a premises liability case in which the jury determines a
defendant property owner negligently failed to prevent a foreseeable
criminal attack, would jury instructions or a special verdict form
requiring the jury to apportion its award of damages among the
property owner and the criminal assailant, pursuant to O.C.G.A.
§ 51-12-33, result in a violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights
to a jury trial, due process or equal protection? 67

As to the first certified question, the court answered that “the jury is
allowed to apportion damages among the property owner and the
criminal assailant . . . .” 68 The answer to this first certified question
(quoting Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172–73, 751 S.E.2d 337, 340 (2013)).
§ 51-12-33(a).
65 291 Ga. 359, 729 S.E.2d 378 (2012).
66 Id. at 359, 729 S.E.2d at 379.
67 Id.
68 Id.
63 Id.

64 O.C.G.A.
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turned on how the court interpreted the statute’s use of the word
“fault.” 69 Section (a) of the statute addresses what to do in cases where
the plaintiff is also partially at fault, directing the jury on how to reduce
the amount of damages in proportion to the fault of the plaintiff and that
of the other at fault parties. 70 Section (b) 71 of the statute addresses all of
the tortfeasors involved, parties and nonparties, and dictates what is to
happen to the total amount of damages to be awarded relative to fault. 72
The court attempted to put all of this in simple terms stating that the
jury should “take the total amount of damages to be awarded to the
plaintiff, identify the persons who are liable, and apportion the damages
to each liable person according to each person’s percentage of fault.” 73
Under this interpretation, fault includes intentional conduct as well
as negligent conduct, with no distinction between the two in terms of
apportionment of the award. 74 The court supported this interpretation by
citing to “direct evidence from the statute . . . that fault is not meant to
be synonymous with negligence” but should interpreted to include other
types of wrongdoing, such as intentional acts. 75 This result contravened
the common law previously followed in Georgia that disallowed
apportionment among negligent and intentional tortfeasors. 76
The second certified question asked whether an apportionment of the
award among the negligent and intentional tortfeasors, pursuant to
O.C.G.A § 51-12-33, would violate the plaintiff’s constitutional right to a
jury trial. 77 The answer was no. 78 The court held that the statute did not
abdicate any part of a party’s due process and that it was not
unconstitutionally vague. 79 The court further stated, “with regard to
equal protection, as set forth above, the statute is certainly supported by
a rational basis of apportioning damages among all tortfeasors
responsible for harming a plaintiff in an efficient and orderly manner.” 80
In applying the holding in Couch to support its ruling in Suzuki, the
court of appeals cited specifically to part of the holding interpreting

69 Id.

O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33(a).
O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33(b) (2020).
72 Id.
73 Couch, 291 Ga. at 361, 729 S.E.2d at 380.
74 Id. at 361–62, 729 S.E.2d at 381.
75 Id. at 362, 729 S.E.2d at 381.
76 Id. at 364, 729 S.E.2d at 382.
77 Id. at 359, 729 S.E.2d at 379.
78 Id. at 367, 729 S.E.2d at 384.
79 Id.
80 Id.

70

71

514

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

fault. 81 The court interpreted the term “fault,” as used in the statue, as
not synonymous with negligence, but to include all types of wrongfulness.
82 Further, in reference to the effect of O.C.G.A § 51-12-33 on the common
law principles currently followed by the state, the court agreed with the
court in Couch that the statute was intended by the General Assembly to
displace the common law of apportionment. 83 In the closing of the court’s
opinion in Suzuki, the court stated the following: “[r]eading the plain
language of the statute in conjunction with Supreme Court’s holding in
Couch, we conclude that the trial court did not err in apportioning John’s
damage award on his claim for strict liability.” 84
In a ruling that may have been a surprise to practitioners in Georgia,
the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals’ Suzuki decision
in Johns v. Suzuki Motor of America, Inc., upholding the trial court’s
application of apportionment to Johns’ strict liability claim. 85 The court
based its ruling upon reading O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33(a) as applying to
“actions ‘for injury to person’ without distinguishing between . . .
theories,” and thus including claims based upon strict liability. 86 The
court also rejected Johns’ argument relying on case law supporting the
prohibition of apportionment in strict liability cases, stating, “we
conclude, as the Court of Appeals did, that the statute supplanted the
no-responsible comparative-negligence holdings of the pre-2005 cases.” 87
The court also disagreed with the arguments that applying
comparative negligence to strict liability claims will essentially end the
application of the strict liability doctrine in the state and is in opposition
to the public policy underlining the doctrine. 88 Although the court
acknowledged the public policy argument that protecting consumers is
important, it agreed with scholars who have argued that is it “unwise to
relieve users and consumers of all responsibility for safe product use and
consumption.” 89 The opinion of the supreme court addressed other
arguments and ultimately reflected a wholesale adoption of the court of
appeals’ decision to affirm the trial court’s application of apportionment
in a strict liability claim. 90 The result is a complete upheaval of what has

81 Suzuki, 351 Ga. App. at 198, 830 S.E.2d at 560 (citing Couch, 291 Ga. at 362, 729
S.E.2d at 381.
82 Id. at 198, 830 S.E.2d at 560.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Johns, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 760 at *2.
86 Id. at *4 (quoting Suzuki, 351 Ga. App. at 198, 830 S.E.2d at 560).
87 Id. at *7.
88 Id. at *12.
89 Id. at *16 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 17 (2009)).
90 Id. at *17.
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been Georgia precedent for over the last half century with regard to
apportionment.
C. A Closer Look at the Related Phenomenon of Apportionment Between
Intentional and Negligent Tortfeasors
The wide sweep of comparative negligence has had an effect beyond
raising questions of apportionment in strict liability claims. The broad
acceptance of the doctrine has led to some courts expressing willingness
to include intentional tortfeasors and negligent tortfeasors in the
assessment of comparative responsibility. 91 Although comparisons in
instances involving high culpability tortfeasors are less common, a more
prevalent example is courts’ willingness to compare fault where a
defendant’s intentional tort did not involve physical harm to others, such
as nuisance claims. 92 An example of a court allowing apportionment
between a negligent tortfeasor was highlighted in the previous section in
the Couch case in which the Georgia Supreme Court held that a jury may
apportion damages among the property owner and a criminal assailant
in a premises liability action. 93 This shift in apportionment principles is
not unique to the state of Georgia.
In Slack v. Famers Insurance Exchange, 94 the Supreme Court of
Colorado reached a conclusion similar to the Supreme Court of Georgia’s
conclusion in Couch as to apportionment between intentional and
negligent tortfeasors in light of their interpretation of a state
apportionment statute. 95 In fact, the Supreme Court of Georgia noted the
Colorado court’s decision in its opinion in Couch. 96 The Colorado court in
Slack approached the question of whether the state statute required pro
rata distribution of liability among intentional and negligent tortfeasors
who cause indivisible injury. 97 The applicable Colorado statute “states
that a tort-feasor shall only be liable for damages to the extent of her
negligence or fault.” 98
The plaintiff in Slack suffered injuries in an automobile accident
caused by the driver of green car running a red light while the plaintiff
was attempting to make a right-hand turn, forcing the plaintiff to stop
suddenly. The abrupt stop caused the plaintiff to hit her chin on the
91 Green,

supra note 20 at 1118.
Ellen M. Bublick, The End Game of Tort Reform: Comparative Apportionment and
Intentional Torts, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 355, 369–70 (2003).
93 Couch, 291 Ga. at 366, 729 S.E.2d at 384.
94 Slack v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 5 P.3d 280 (Colo. 2000).
95 Id. at 282.
96 291 Ga. at 363, 729 S.E.2d at 382 n.6 (citing Slack, 5 P.3d at 285).
97 Slack, 5 P.3d at 282.
98 Id. (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111.5(1) (2020)).
92
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steering wheel and her head on the headrest. Following the accident, the
plaintiff saw a chiropractor to assess her injuries who then submitted the
charges for treatment to the plaintiff’s insurance company, the defendant
Farmers Insurance. The defendant wanted a second opinion as to the
plaintiff’s injury and scheduled her an appointment to see another
chiropractor, Dr. Lloyd Lachow. Unbeknownst to the plaintiff, another
insured of the defendant had filed a sexual assault allegation against Dr.
Lachow. During the plaintiff’s examination, Dr. Lachow touched the
plaintiff inappropriately and exacerbated her injuries by violently
shaking her head from side to side. The plaintiff filed a complaint with
the local police and ultimately brought suit against Lachow for assault,
battery, and negligence among, other claims. 99 The plaintiff also brought
suit claiming the defendant “acted improperly by sending her to a [doctor]
[the defendant] knew or should have known would injure her.” 100
At trial, the jury awarded a verdict in favor of the plaintiff against
the defendant, finding that it acted willfully and wantonly. The plaintiff
was awarded $40,000 for her injuries and $16,000 in exemplary
damages. 101 The court apportioned the damages among Farmers
Insurance and Dr. Lachow, finding them to be forty and sixty percent at
fault respectively. 102 The plaintiff appealed the apportionment of her
award, arguing that Colorado Statute § 13-21-111.5(1) 103 does not
require apportionment between a negligent actor (Farmers Insurance)
and an intentional tort-feasor (Dr. Lachow). 104 The Supreme Court of
Colorado disagreed. 105
In holding that the apportionment of damages between a negligent
and intentional tortfeasor was appropriate, the Colorado Supreme Court
relied on its interpretation of the apportionment statute, Colo. Rev. Stat.
§ 13-21-111.5(1), which resulted from the tort reform movement in
Colorado. 106 The Court interpreted the first part of the statute,
§ 13-21-111.5(1), as encompassing a “wide variety of situations” and
therefore as applicable to the intentional tort of assault and battery
involved in Slack. 107 The court then moved to the second part of the
statute which states, “no defendant shall be liable for an amount greater

Id. at 282–83.
Id. at 283.
101 Id. at 283 (the jury also found in favor of the plaintiff’s husband’s loss of consortium
claim and awarded him $6,000 for his loss and $2,400 in exemplary damages.).
102 Id.
103 COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111.5(1) (2020).
104 Slack, 5 P.3d at 283.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 284.
107 Id.
99

100
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than that represented by the degree or percentage of the negligence or
fault attributable to such defendant that produced the claimed injury,
death, damage, or loss.” 108 The court held that the use of the word “fault”
in the statute encompassed both negligent and intentional
wrongdoing. 109 As a result of this interpretation, the court held that the
apportionment statute “applies even when one of the several tortfeasors
commits an intentional tort that contributes to an indivisible injury.” 110
The court further supported its holding by quoting the following from
a previous case addressing the abolishment of the common law principle
of joint and several liability:
[t]he adoption of [the pro-rata division of liability] was intended to cure
the perceived inequality under the common law concept of joint and
several liability whereby wrongdoers could be held fully responsible
for a plaintiff’s entire loss, despite the fact that another wrongdoer,
who was not held accountable, contributed to the result. 111

The court held that neither the reasoning nor the result should differ
when an intentional tortfeasor contributes to the loss. 112 As a result, the
court affirmed the apportionment of damages among the negligent and
intentional tortfeasors. 113 Thus, the court displaced the common law rule
against such apportionment in Colorado. 114
V. THE FUTURE OF STRICT LIABILITY CLAIMS IN GEORGIA
A. An Argument Against the Georgia Supreme Court’s Affirming the
Application of Apportionment to Claims Based in Strict Liability
At its core, strict liability is liability without fault. It is based on our
belief as a society that those who are engaging in certain activities that
pose a risk to others should be held responsible for the result, regardless
of whether they exercised reasonable care or not. In the realm of products
liability, holding a manufacturer strictly liable for defective products is
based on a theory of cost sharing. When a consumer is injured by a
defective product, who is better positioned to bear the costs of such harm?
The average consumer or the manufacturer profiting from the sale of the
product? These are the ideas behind the doctrine of strict liability today.

at 284–85 (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-1115(1)).
Id. at 286.
110 Id.
111 Id. (quoting Barton v. Adams Rental, Inc., 938 P.2d 532, 535 (Colo. 1997)).
112 Id.
113 Id. at 288.
114 Id.
108 Id.
109
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The Georgia Supreme Court should have reversed the decision of the
court of appeals to allow apportionment in strict liability claims in light
of the intent of the strict liability statute in the state. The Georgia strict
liability statute reads, in part, as follows:
The manufacturer of any personal property sold as new property
directly or through a dealer or any other person shall be liable in tort,
irrespective of privity, to any natural person who may use, consume,
or reasonably be affected by the property and who suffers injury to his
person or property because the property when sold by the
manufacturer was not merchantable and reasonably suited to the use
intended, and its condition when sold is the proximate cause of the
injury sustained. 115

The enactment of this statute, which created strict products liability in
the state, intends to replace the previous common law system which
“‘adhered generally to traditional concepts requiring proof of negligence
in tort actions and privity in contract actions on warranties’ to hold
manufacturers of defective products liable.” 116 Through enacting this
statute, the Georgia legislature expressed clear intent to replace the
previously followed common law principles with a medium through
which to hold the manufacturer responsible for the safety of its products.
The shift of placing the burden of loss caused by defective products
onto the manufacturer, rather than the consumer, is based on a theory of
cost sharing. Manufacturers are in the unique position to be able to
absorb the cost of loss from defective products as a cost of doing business.
In having to so do, the manufacturers are presented with an economic
incentive to ensure that the production, designs, and products
themselves are safe for consumers—safer products mean a lower chance
of liability. Further, the manufacturer is in a better position to detect and
remediate dangerous product defects through research and development
and quality control procedures. These theories in support of shifting the
burden onto the manufacturer are acknowledged in the Restatement
(Second) of Torts 117 which includes the following:
On whatever theory, the justification for the strict liability has been
said to be that the seller, by marketing his product for use and
consumption, has undertaken and assumed special responsibility
toward any member of the consuming public who may be injured by it;
115 O.C.G.A.

§ 51-1-11 (2020).
Brief of Amicus Curiae Georgia Trial Lawyers Association in Support of Petitioners
at *7, Johns v. Suzuki Motor of Am., 2020 GA S. Ct. Lexis 760 (2020) (No. S19G1478), 2020
GA S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1233 (quoting Ellis v. Rich’s, Inc., 233 Ga. 573, 576, 212 S.E.2d 373,
376 (1975)).
117 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. c (Am. Law Inst. 1965).
116
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that the public has the right to and does expect, in the case of products
which it needs and for which it forced to rely upon the seller, that
reputable sellers will stand behind their goods; that public policy
demands that the burden of accidental injuries caused by products
intended for consumption be placed upon those who market them, and
be treated as a cost of production against which liability insurance can
be obtained; and that the consumer of such products is entitles to the
maximum of protection at the hands of someone, and the proper
persons to afford it are those who market the products. 118

By providing a medium through which the costs of defective products are
to be placed on the manufacturer, the Georgia General Assembly adopted
a public policy in favor of protecting consumers injured by defective
products.
The argument that through the amendment of the apportionment
statute in response to health care issues in the state, the General
Assembly intended to reverse the public policy of burdening
manufacturers in strict liability claims rather than consumers is thin at
best. The argument is further weakened by the fact that the Georgia
Constitution 119 places the power to alter public policy in the hands of the
legislature, not the judiciary. 120 Here, the Georgia Supreme Court’s
affirming of apportionment in a strict liability case, resulting in a
consumer bearing almost half of what the statute intended to be the
manufacturer’s burden, has illuminated a shift in public policy and not
by the specific action of the legislature.
Not only does this statutory interpretation by the court “invert the
proper constitutional order,” 121 but it should be noted that the same
justifications for the public policy of protecting consumers recognized by
the legislature through the enactment of the strict liability in 1968 are
very much present today. In today’s society consumers are inundated
with the marketing of consumer products. In fact, the science of consumer
marketing has reached new levels which go as far as curating
consumer-specific ad content to be shown on identified consumers’ social
media platforms. Marketing has increased, and the availability of
products has greatly expanded. Retailers like Amazon make it possible
for consumers to access products located across the country in as few as
two days. As the market grows, so does the business of manufacturing.
With this expanded market for consumer products, why would this be the
time to alter the paramount purpose of strict liability—the protection of
otherwise defenseless victims? In an age of multimillion dollar companies
118 Id.

GA. CONST.
GA. CONST. Art. III, § 1, para. 1.
121 Amicus Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 116, at *12.
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selling more products than ever with increasing profit margins,
manufacturers are likely in the best position in recent history to absorb
the cost of defective products.
B. Alternative Statutory Interpretation of O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33 as
Inapplicable to the Doctrine of Strict Liability
The rejection of common law principles in favor of applying
apportionment to strict liability claims and among negligent and
intentional tortfeasors has clearly been a result, at least in part, of courts’
interpretations of various statutory amendments and acts catalyzed by
the national tort reform movement of the past few decades. However,
there is dissent among justices as to whether the interpretations of these
statutes as rejecting common law principles truly effectuate the intent of
the legislatures. In Couch, the Georgia case discussed above which
upheld apportionment between negligent and intentionally tortfeasors,
Justice Benham dissented to the opinion stating, “I cannot agree with the
majority when it opines that the General Assembly intended to eviscerate
more than a century of Georgia’s common law simply by using ‘fault’ in
O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33.” 122
Unlike Georgia, other states that have enacted comparative fault
statutes have provided a definition for “fault” as used in the statutes to
limit it to acts of negligence. 123 However, the Georgia assembly did not
provide a definition, leaving the interpretation of the term to the
courts. 124 The term “fault” has a litany of definitions that make it unclear
where the line should be drawn—does the term extend beyond negligence
to intentional acts, to strict liability, to breach of warranty and so on? 125
The following presumption in construing a statute is noted by Justice
Benham in his dissent:
All statutes are presumed to be enacted by the legislature with full
knowledge of the existing condition of the law and with reference to it.
They are therefore to be construed in connection with and in harmony
with the existing law, . . . and their meaning and effect is to be
determined in connection, not only with the common law and the
constitution, but also with reference to other statutes and the decisions
of the courts. 126

291 Ga. at 367 (Benham, J., dissenting).
10 DEL. CODE ANN. § 8132 (2012); see also S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-9-2 (2011).
124 Couch, 291 Ga. at 370–71, 729 S.E.2d at 386.
125 Id. at 370–71, 729 S.E.2d at 387 (Benham, J., dissenting).
126 Id. at 372, 729 S.E.2d at 387–88 (Benham, J., dissenting) (quoting Thornton v.
Anderson, 207 Ga. 714, 718, 64 S.E.2d 186, 189 (1951)).
122 Couch,
123 See
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When O.C.G.A § 51-12-33 was amended in 2005 as part of a group of
reforms to address issues in health care services in the state, both the
common law rule against apportionment among negligent intentional
tortfeasors and against apportionment in strict liability claims were very
much followed and recognized by Georgia courts. 127 In regards to the
applicability of the statute to strict liability, the 2005 reforms did not
once mention the term “strict liability” nor did it mention O.C.G.A.
§ 51-1-11, 128 the Georgia strict liability statute. 129 Given the above
presumption used in construing statutes, this is jarring evidence that it
is highly unlikely the legislature intended the statute to alter or overturn
the common law rule against apportionment in strict liability claims
followed by the state. It perhaps even suggests that the legislature did
not even consider the possible implication of such as a result of the
reforms.
Further, another canon of interpretation is that “statutory
construction requires that a statute in derogation of the common law be
construed strictly by the courts.” 130 In application, because the term
“fault” as used by the general assembly can be defined expansively or
narrowly, strict construction precludes construing the term in a manner
that would overturn common law. 131 In application here, the term should
have been interpreted as not extending all the way to strict liability—a
result of what can be classified as an incredibly broad interpretation.
VI. THE INEVITABLE EFFECT OF APPLYING APPORTIONMENT IN STRICT
LIABILITY CASES IN GEORGIA
A. Comparison of the Common Law Principles and the Actions of the
Georgia Supreme Court in Suzuki
Under the common law principles which have historically been
followed in Georgia, contributory negligence by a plaintiff is not a defense
available in strict liable claims for product-caused harms. 132 This is
partly because the principles underlying strict liability are distinct from
those of negligence. Strict liability is liability without fault, and as such,
the fault of the defendant is considered to be irrelevant if the actual cause

Amicus Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 116, at *2.
O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11 (2020).
129 Amicus Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 115, at *2.
130 Couch, 291 Ga. at 374, 729 S.E.2d at 389 (citing Tampa Investment Group v. Branch
Banking and Trust, 290 Ga. 724, 725–28, 723 S.E.2d 674, 677–79 (2012)) (Benham, J.,
dissenting).
131 Id.
132 Deere & Co., 250 Ga. at 520, 299 S.E.2d at 707.
127
128
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of the injury is a defect in the product, not the plaintiff’s carelessness. 133
In Suzuki, if the common law was followed, Johns’ failure to properly
maintain his bike’s brake fluid would have no effect on the damages
awarded by the jury. By finding the product defect to be the proximate
cause of the injuries he sustained, the defendant would be entirely liable
for the amount awarded by the jury. The application of apportionment of
fault to Johns by the jury however makes a substantial difference in the
amount he stands to collect from the product manufacturer, Suzuki. The
jury awarded Johns $10.5 million in compensatory damages for the harm
he suffered. Apportioning 49% of the fault to Johns himself results in a
reduction of $5,145,000, or in other words, one percent less than half of
the entire award.
Although contributory negligence has historically not been available
as a defense to strict liability claims in Georgia, other recognized
defenses related primarily to the element of proximate cause put into
place barriers to recovery for those injured by consumer products. In
order to hold a defendant strictly liable, the plaintiff must show that the
defendant is (1) the manufacturer of the product; (2) that the product
when sold by the manufacturer was defective; and (3) that the defect was
the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the plaintiff. 134 One
defense available to the defendant, known as product misuse, allows the
defendant to argue that the plaintiff’s misuse of the product was the
proximate cause of the injury they sustained. 135 The plaintiff’s alleged
misuse of the product must be significant enough to break the chain of
causation between the defect in the product and the plaintiff’s injury. In
this sense, the plaintiff’s negligence in misusing the product is only being
considered as it relates to the causation element of the injury. The
negligence is not being used as a way to reduce recovery by comparing
fault, as it was in Johns. 136
Another available defense to strict products liability is assumption of
the risk. 137 Under this affirmative defense, a defendant must establish
the plaintiff (1) had knowledge of a condition inconsistent with his or her
safety; (2) the plaintiff appreciated the danger presented by the
condition; and (3) the plaintiff deliberately and voluntarily chose to
expose him or herself to that danger in a manner that is consistent with
assent to the continuance of the dangerous condition. 138 Whether a
133 Id.

134 Chi Hardware & Fixture Co. v. Letterman, 236 Ga. App. 21, 23, 510 S.E.2d 875, 877–
78 (1999).
135 Id.
136 351 Ga. at 186, 830 S.E.2d at 552.
137 Dean v. Toyota Indus. Equip. Mfg., 246 Ga. App. 255, 255, 540 S.E.2d 233, 234 (2000).
138 Id.
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plaintiff assumed the risk of injury is ultimately a question to be decided
by the jury. Further, courts in Georgia apply the risk utility test to
determine whether the risks inherent in a product design outweigh the
utility of the product. In other words, the jury must decide whether by
choosing a specific “design, the manufacturer exposed the consumer to a
greater risk than it should have.” 139 The factors considered in this
analysis include: “the usefulness of the product; the gravity and severity
of the danger” the design poses; the likelihood of the danger; the extent
to which the danger is avoidable; the efficacy of the product’s warning;
the manufacture’s ability to eliminate the danger without impeding on
the product’s usefulness or price; etcetera. 140
The implications of the availability of these defenses to product
manufacturers is that when someone in Georgia is somehow injured by a
consumer product, there is not automatically a slam-dunk strict products
liability claim. Plaintiffs face an uphill climb to recovery. With the
additional component of the applicability of apportionment to strict
liability claims, the ascent to recovery has now become even steeper.
Apportionment may now allow manufacturers to further avoid liability
through the ability to reduce the percentage of their fault through
apportionment to not just the plaintiff for their degree of fault, but also
to other third parties who may become involved. Under the common law
principles which have been followed for the past-half century in Georgia,
plaintiffs rightfully avoided this additional barrier to seeking justice.
B. The Concerns for Practitioners and Plaintiffs in Response to the
Application of Apportionment in Strict Liability Claims
The Georgia Supreme Court’s upholding of the Suzuki decision in the
court of appeals has left many Georgia trial lawyers scratching their
heads. As previously stated, the supreme court’s affirming of the court of
appeals’ displacement of common law principles in favor of allowing
apportionment in strict liability claims has upturned over fifty years of
Georgia precedent. The Georgia Trial Lawyers Association filed an
Amicus Curiae brief with the supreme court in favor of the petitioners
asking the court to reverse the judgement of the Court of Appeals. 141
The brief expressed one fear held by many practitioners, that the court
of appeals’ decision “if left standing, [will] prevent people injured by
defective products who sue the manufacturer in strict liability from
recovering if the trier of fact finds that the injured person’s percentage of
fault was at least 50 percent.” 142 This results in a manufacturer bearing
at 259, 540 S.E.2d at 237.
v. ICI Americas, 264 Ga. 732, 736 n.6, 450 S.E.2d 671, 675 n.6 (1994).
141 Amicus Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 116, at *1.
142 Id. at *12–13.
139 Id.
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no responsibility or cost whatsoever, when the basis of strict liability as
imposed by Georgia statute is for the manufacturer to bear all of that
burden. 143
The affirmation of the court of appeals also makes it more difficult for
plaintiffs injured by defective products to recover from the manufacturer
by allowing fault to be apportioned not only to the plaintiff themselves,
but also to third parties. This is in addition to the already available
defenses of product misuse, other proximate cause, and assumption of
the risk. Distinctively, these defenses work in harmony with the public
policy that shifts the burden onto the manufacturer because they should
not be liable where the proximate cause of the injury was not the
defective product itself. However, the application of the doctrine of
comparative negligence allows the manufacturer to avoid all or part of
the damages where the defective product is at least one proximate cause
of the plaintiff’s injury. As a result, the application of apportionment to
strict liability has simply placed another barrier between a plaintiff
injured by a defective product and recovery from the manufacturer of said
product. Nonetheless, there is one victor at the expense of injured
Georgians: the product manufacturers.

Carey Sartain
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Id. at *13.

